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Abstract. That dropping the rational expectations assumption opens the door to
many more patterns of volatility as equilibrium phenomena is not surprising. That
this continues to be so even after requiring the expectations to be formed rationally is
indeed surprising. In effect, requiring the agents to form expectations rationally —in
the sense of being such that they maximize at any time the likelihood of observed
history— does not pin down what is an equilibrium outcome much better than allow-
ing for arbitrary expectations, unless the agents have access to unlimited historical
records or memory. More specifically, I establish, in simple deterministic overlapping
generations economies, that if each agent holds rationally formed expectations in the
sense that any other expectations justifying his choices imply a smaller likelihood
for the history he observes with limited memory, then there are rationally formed
expectations equilibria exhibiting an excess volatility that no rational expectations
equilibrium can match. Moreover, from the allocation viewpoint, these new equi-
libria can be supported also by many other expectations (not necessarily rationally
formed). Given that the limited records or finite memory case may arguably be the
relevant one from a positive viewpoint, this result suggests that the possibility of
excess volatility as an equilibrium phenomenon has been downplayed by the use of
the rational expectations hypothesis.
1. Introduction
Volatility of prices is undesirable for risk averse agents because it prevents them
to be certain about the prices they will face in the future, which may lead them
to incur in costly mistakes. An important part of the price volatility seems to be
an unavoidable consequence of the uncertainty about the fundamentals themselves.
But prices usually exhibit a much higher variance than the fundamentals.1 The
variance of prices that cannot be completely justified by that of the fundamentals
I thank helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper from attendants to the 3rd
CARESS-Cowles Conference on General Equilibrium and its Applications, the 2007 SAET con-
ference, the 2007 European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, the 2007 Far Eastern
Meeting of the Econometric Society, and to attendants to seminars in the University of Tokyo,
Kyoto University, and Kobe University.
1See Shiller (1981) for an account focused on stock prices in particular.
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is referred to as excess volatility.2 Given its cost in terms of efficiency and welfare,
it is of obvious interest to have an assessment of to what extent and how excess
volatility can be avoided or at least reduced. Of course, first one would like to have
an idea of how serious the problem may be according to the best understanding
available of how sequential competitive markets work.
Excess volatility has long been thought to be the result of the agents’ own deci-
sions as they expect this same volatility to take place.3 This has been so because
there seems to be a self-confirming or self-fulfilling aspect in the nature of excess
volatility. Even if this suggests that there must be something irrational about excess
volatility, it has nevertheless been shown that the phenomenon of excess volatility
is perfectly consistent with the notion of rational expectations equilibrium that is
standard for sequential dynamic general equilibrium models, in particular through
its sunspot equilibrium version.4 Still, I argue in this paper that the use of the
rational expectations hypothesis may very well underestimate the possibility of ex-
cess volatility of prices and trades as an equilibrium outcome. Interestingly enough,
this misleading feature of the rational expectations equilibrium notion becomes ap-
parent when one tries to address the fact that the rational expectations hypothesis
does not provide an expectations formation theory, which turns out to be not as
innocuous as it seems from the viewpoint of the rationality of expectations.
In effect, general equilibrium models leave unmodelled the formation of prices as
well as the formation of expectations over future prices, whenever markets open se-
quentially. The equilibrium equations only impose on prices the condition of being
such that markets clear when agents react rationally to them, but no explanation
is provided as to how these prices do actually emerge in the market, which is rather
inconvenient in the very common case in which there is a multiplicity of equilibria.
As for the expectations, they are often required to satisfy a condition that rules
out the possibility of the agents making systematic forecasting mistakes that would
compromise their assumed rationality. The satisfaction of this condition —namely,
the identification of subjective and objective expectations about future prices—
is the rational expectations hypothesis. But the corresponding notion of rational
expectations equilibrium does not provide any more explanations about how the
agents form their expectations about future prices than about the formation of
prices themselves. In this sense, the condition imposed by the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis is unduely freed from the requirement of having to be consistent
with some procedure (hopefully reasonable) that the agents may use to form their
expectations.
At least two strands of the literature have addressed the issue of how can the
agents get to know the expectations held in a rational expectations equilibrium,
2This term is used in the literature to refer more specifically to the volatility exhibited in
particular by stock prices in excess of what would be justifiable from changes in the present value
of future dividends to be distributed by firms, but I’ll use it here to refer, more generally, to that
part of the volatility of the prices determined by a general equilibrium model that exceeds the
volatility of the fundamentals.
3Shiller (1987) attributes to Pigou (1929) the view that ”psychological causes”, along with
”monetary causes”, can account for as much as a half of the amplitude of aggregate fluctuations.
4See Shell (1977) and Cass and Shell (1983) for the seminal papers on the notion of sunspot
equilibrium, Azariadis (1981) for its first application to the overlapping generations model, and
Woodford (1986) for an application to infinitely-lived agents with finance constraints.
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namely the adaptive learning and the eductive learning literatures. The adap-
tive learning approach5 considers under what conditions the process followed by
prices in a rational expectations equilibrium can be learned, in real time, updating
the information available as the process realizes.6 Quite differently, the eductive
learning approach tries to characterize the conditions under which, from the very
understanding of the problem they face, the agents can deduce in no time that a
particular rational expectations equilibrium is the only possible outcome (at least
locally) and hence they coordinate immediately on it.7 Nevertheless, rational expec-
tations equilibria that are not ”learnable” by an updating process (as the adaptive
learning literature would like) or rationalizable in a game-theoretic sense (as the
eductive learning literature would desire) are not less of an equilibrium than those
that are learnable in one way or another. Thus it should be noted from the start
that both the adaptive and the eductive learning approaches look essentially for
ways to discern whether some rational expectations equilibria are more ”reason-
able” than others, i.e. following a logic of refinement of the equilibrium concept.
As a matter of fact, these approaches originated from the need to address the in-
determinacy problem that the existence of a multiplicity of rational expectations
equilibria usually created. Here, I address instead the issue of whether the rational
expectations equilibrium concept itself has led to overlooking some excess volatility
phenomena as equilibrium outcomes, which leads us to scrutinize the implicit as-
sumptions (or rather the lack of them) on the rationality of the process of formation
of expectations under the rational expectations hypothesis.
In effect, the lack of implications of the rational expectations hypothesis on an
expectations formation theory makes possible that, for instance, the expectations
prescribed to an agent at any given date by a rational expectations equilibrium need
not be those that explain best the history observed by the agent then. But, since
any sensible expectations formation theory should make the agents’ expectations
follow from the information available to them at the time of making their decisions
—namely the history of past prices— this is a clear shortcoming of the rational
expectations hypothesis that does not become apparent until the expectations for-
mation issue is addressed.
Also, in a stationary rational expectations equilibrium the agents’ beliefs are
history independent, which is clearly counterfactual, unless the agents have access
to infinite histories of past prices and unlimited computing ability to process them.
From a positive viewpoint, beliefs do result from past experiences —which actually
do never extend (or at least their records) to an infinitely remote past— and the de-
pendence of actual beliefs on the observed past is also clearly non-trivial. Since any
sensible theory about the formation of the agents’ beliefs, and hence expectations,
needs to make them follow from the information available to agents at the time
they make their decisions, then an alternative assumption about the expectations
at equilibrium is needed.
5See for instance Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a recent account.
6See, for instance, Woodford (1990) and Evans-Honkapohja (2003) for the possibility of learning
this way the expectations of a stationary sunspot equilibrium.
7See Desgranges-Negroni (2003) for the issue of the coordination of expectations on a sunspot
equilibrium through an eductive approach. For the seminal paper on the eductive learning ap-
proach see Guesnerie (1992).
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Alternatively to the refinement logic, one can think of imposing on the expec-
tations other rationality conditions that are compatible with some sensible way of
forming expectations from observable data. The need for these rationality condi-
tions to comply with some sensible expectations formation theory is particularly
pressing in the case in which the phenomenon of excess volatility is most dramatic,
namely when there is no uncertainty at all about the fundamentals (in the extreme
ideal case in which the fundamentals are deterministic, any variance exhibited by
prices and trades corresponds, by definition, to excess volatility). In effect, while in
the presence of shocks to the fundamentals it is natural to assume that the agents
can use the information they may have on the stochastic process followed by these
shocks in order to form their beliefs on that process, and hence their expectations
about future realizations and prices, when no shock affects the fundamentals the
origin of expectations remains a mystery,8 and they look as being pinned down, at
equilibrium, only by their self-confirming character. When one modifies accordingly
the equilibrium notion in order to introduce a rationality condition on expectations
that is consistent with some sensible way to form expectations, new instances of
excess volatility of prices and trades turn out to be equilibrium outcomes.
That new instances of equilibrium excess volatility appear when the expectations
are not required to coincide with objective ones (as rational expectations would
have it) is not surprising, since many more degrees of freedom are introduced in
this way. That the most sensible rationality requirements from the formations of
expectations —namely that they are consistent with the information available at
the time of their formation— does not constrain what can be and what cannot be
an equilibrium excess volatility any more than letting expectations to be arbitrary
ones is certainly surprising.
In particular, I explore in this paper the consequences of taking the view that,
whenever several distinct beliefs or expectations can lead an agent to make a given
decision, to assume that the agent’s beliefs are not those that explain best the ob-
served history amounts to assume that the agent does not form his expectations
or beliefs rationally, whatever the method used is. As a consequence, I consider
the rationality condition on the formation of expectations that requires that when-
ever several beliefs justify a given choice, the agent is supposed to hold those that
conform best with his observations.
One could say that, if the rational expectations hypothesis ”is nothing else than
the extension of the rationality hypothesis to expectations” (Guesnerie (1992)), the
hypothesis above is nothing else than the extension of the rationality hypothesis to
the formation of expectations. Moreover, imposing a rationality condition on the
formation of expectations seems more natural than imposing a rationality condi-
tion on expectations themselves, since the problem of formation of expectations is
in essence a choice problem on which rationality requirements are more straight-
forwardly meaningful than the usual rational expectations requirement that the
agents ”know the model”, which is only a handwaving substitute for the explicit
acknowledgement of the Nash-like, fixed point nature of the rational expectations.
Nevertheless, I wish to stress that I do stop short of modelling explicitly the forma-
8In a sunspot equilibrium the beliefs have the logical status of a Nash equilibrium in beliefs,
with the coordination problem that that brings along in the (very common) case in which there
is a multiplicity of them.
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tion of expectations as a choice problem. I will just require that, however this choice
problem may be modelled, the resulting expectations must satisfy the rationality
condition expressed above, namely that the expectations or beliefs upon which a
decision is made must explain history better than any other beliefs justifying the
same decision.
More specifically, I will consider in a deterministic overlapping generations ex-
change economy that agents hold rationally formed expectations, in the sense that
any other expectations consistent with their choices follow from beliefs implying
a smaller likelihood for the history they observe. I show then first that a belief
by the agents that the history they observe is Markovian can never be falsified
(Lemma 1). Then, restricting the analysis to Markovian beliefs, I establish that
whenever the agents’ memories or records of past events are finite (which is the rel-
evant positive case), there exist rationally formed expectations equilibria exhibiting
an excess volatility that no rational expectations (sunspot) equilibrium can match
(Proposition 3). Quite disturbingly, what kind of excess volatility can be an equi-
librium outcome is not actually constrained by the rationality condition above on
the formation of expectations, the new instances of equilibrium excess volatility be-
ing the same as those driven by many other expectations not necessarily rationally
formed. Nonetheless, the existence of such equilibria in this abstraction suggests
that the role of excess volatility in the working of actual competitive markets may
be much more important than what the widespread use of the rational expectations
hypothesis may suggest.
In the alternative counterfactual case in which the agents were able to keep track
of an infinite history of past prices, then the only rationally formed expectations
equilibria turn out to be those that are observationally equivalent to some rational
expectations sunspot equilibrium (Proposition 2).
A rationally formed expectations equilibrium will thus consist of, for each agent
in each generation and for every history of prices he may observe, (1) a belief that
the prices follow a particular stochastic process, and (2) consumption decisions
(contingent to future prices in the case of future consumptions), such that, for any
history of prices that may realize up to any date, (i) the resulting allocation of
resources is feasible, (ii) the agents’ consumption choices maximize their utilities
given the price process they believe they face,9 and (iii) the agents’ beliefs about the
price process are formed rationally, i.e. their beliefs provide the highest likelihood
to the histories they observe among all the beliefs that could have led them to make
the same consumption choices, and are never falsified by the history observed.
Note that the equilibrium concept leaves open the question of how is determined
the history of prices that actually realizes. It just requires that it does not falsify
the agents’ beliefs. But this does not prevent the agents to believe that prices
follow a Markov chain, since this cannot be falsified by any history of prices. In
effect, as it will be established in Lemma 1 in Section 3, histories of prices going
back into the infinite past exhibit the Markov property, namely that empirical
frequencies of transitions between prices depend only on the price from which the
transition starts; and for histories of prices with a finite past, any dependence of
these empirical frequencies on past prices eventually vanishes.
9For the overlapping generations economies considered below it will turn out that in doing so
they will be maximizing their utilities subject to the prices they eventually face as well.
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Therefore, no objective process is assumed to drive prices. As a consequence,
there is no room for agents to mistake a price process they supposedly face (this,
in contrast, would be the ultimate rationality test under rational expectations). It
is important to stress that, in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals, assuming
that some objective stochastic process (like the one followed by a sunspot signal)
drives the prices,10 amounts to postulate implicitly a particular price formation the-
ory —extraneous to the equilibrium conditions and hence alien to market-clearing
forces— that acts in an ad hoc way as a selecting device within the set of possi-
ble price histories. Given the obvious difficulties in justifying the causation from
sunspots all the way through prices, I do away with it. Note also that if on the
contrary the fundamentals do follow some stochastic process, the latter will make
its way through the equilibrium equations towards the equilibrium prices, in such a
way that one can safely speak in that case of a stochastic process driving prices. So,
the caveat above about assuming an objective price process is truly specific to the
pure excess volatility case with deterministic fundamentals that we are considering
in this paper.
It will be established below that, in a rationally formed expectations equilibrium
of an overlapping generations economy, there is room for different agents (within
and across generations) to hold different expectations. This diversity of beliefs
across generations is only a natural consequence of the fact that different gener-
ations observe different bits of a same history of prices and therefore form their
beliefs rationally using different information. Note also that, within generations,
the requirement for each agents’ expectations to be consistent with their possi-
bly different choices leaves room for the agents to hold different expectations even
when they have the same information, which may reflect the very realistic fact of
differences of opinion or interpretation even in the face of the same evidence.
In considering explicitly rationality conditions on the way the agents form their
beliefs, as part of the definition of the equilibrium, I depart thus from the rational
expectations equilibrium concept insofar the latter actually remains silent about
how the agents may have arrived to hold such expectations to begin with. The
approach followed in this paper thus adds an element missing in the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium concept. This will show itself clearly in the definition of
a rationally formed expectations equilibrium below, which will embed that of a
rational expectations sunspot equilibrium as a rationally formed expectations equi-
librium constrained to satisfy the strong and, more importantly, counterfactual
requirement of having the agents to hold common beliefs that are independent of
the histories they observe.
Before proceeding with the main body of the paper, I will discuss briefly but
more specifically the differences between the approach followed in this paper about
the rationality in the formation of expectations and some of the approaches in
the literature on learning rational expectations. The rationality condition that I
consider on the formation of expectations seems reminiscent of the one underlying
10In the sunspot equilibrium literature it is customary to claim that the prices turn out to
be perfectly correlated with the sunspot signal, and hence follow the same process, because the
decisions made by the agents according to their belief in such a perfect correlation causes the
prices to take the adequate values with the adequate probabilities for that perfect correlation to
actually take place. But how the agents’ decisions would achieve this is left unexplained.
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the rational beliefs equilibrium concept of Kurz (1994). Nonetheless, rationally
formed expectations differ essentially from Kurz’s rational beliefs. They only share
the idea that the rationality of expectations or ”beliefs should be defined relative
to what is learnable from the data” (Kurz (1994), p.879). Otherwise, Kurz (1994)
requires the agents to believe that prices are driven by a process whose long term
behavior coincides with that of the true process. Leaving aside the problem posed
by the ad hoc character of such a true process in the pure extrinsic uncertainty
case, in order to infer such long term behavior Kurz (1994) assumes that the agents
have access to infinitely long histories of past prices, a formidable feat that the
rationally formed expectations equilibrium does not require.
The approach considered here is also distinct from the adaptive learning approach
in Woodford (1990) insofar in that paper the agents learn some information about
the ”support” (specifically the optimal labor supply for each value of the sunspot)
while I focus on how the agents infer the probabilities of transition between states
that have been historically observed. Moreover, in Woodford (1990) agent t’s pref-
erences suffer from an additive shock εtst, linear in the agent savings (labor supply
in Woodford’s interpretation), where εt is an independently and identically dis-
tributed process with Et(εt) = 0 and variance σ2 > 0 whose distribution the agents
learn from past realizations. It is from the accidental sample correlation between
the small fluctuations in the relative price ptpt+1 generated by these shocks and the
sunspot realizations that agents’ beliefs in the sunspot theory can get reinforced
and thus convergence to a stationary sunspot equilibrium obtains. As Woodford
points out, the presence of these shocks to the fundamentals is thus essential for
the learning to occur. In contrast, in the rationally formed expectations equilibria
considered in this paper there is no room for an intrinsic uncertainty to play any
role whatsoever.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 conveys the main
ideas by means of a leading example that allows to ”visualize” what is driving
the result: it produces constructively rationally formed expectations equilibria ex-
hibiting fluctuations distinct from those of any rational expectations equilibrium.
Section 3 generalizes the setup, provides a precise definition of a rationally formed
expectations equilibrium for a deterministic overlapping generations economy, and
establishes the existence of equilibria of this type exhibiting fluctuations that no
rational expectations equilibrium could generate. Incidentally, the constructive
argument used to establish this result reveals a high level of degrees of freedom
to produce rationally formed expectations equilibria. Thus, I conclude establishing
next the important fact that not anything can actually be supported as a rationally
formed expectations equilibrium.
2. The leading example
2.1 What is a rationally formed expectations equilibrium?
Consider an overlapping generations economy with a 2-period lived representa-
tive agent. An agent born in period t lives for two periods and has to make a
decision about how much to save from real income y when young (date t) in order
to be able to consume when old (date t+ 1). His decision will depend on the pur-
chasing power he expects his savings to have when old. In particular, if the current
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price of consumption is pt and he expects it to be, when old, any of k possible values
pjt+1, for j = 1, . . . , k, with probabilities pi
j respectively, then his chosen level st of
savings would be determined by the solution to
max
k∑
j=1
piju(ctt, c
tj
t+1)
ctt + s
t = y
ctjt+1 =
pt
pjt+1
st
(1)
where ctt is his consumption when young and c
tj
t+1 is his consumption when old if
the level of prices then is pjt+1. Under standard assumptions guaranteeing differen-
tiability and the interiority of the solution, the necessary and sufficient first-order
condition characterizing the solution of the problem above is, along with its budget
constraints,
k∑
j=1
pij
[
− u1(y − st, pt
pjt+1
st) + u2(y − st, pt
pjt+1
st)
pt
pjt+1
]
= 0. (2)
At equilibrium every agent must choose his consumption rationally according to
his expectations about future prices, and individual consumption decisions must
be compatible. Thus in an equilibrium of this economy in which the level of prices
takes, at any period, one of k possible values p1, . . . , pk, and the representative
agent believes that the probability piij of the price being pj when old depends then
only on the price pi he faces when young, the representative agent’s savings decision
depends only on the level of prices pi he faces when young, so that it can be denoted
si and be characterized as the solution to
k∑
j=1
piij
[
− u1(y − si, p
i
pj
si) + u2(y − si, p
i
pj
si)
pi
pj
]
= 0. (3)
Moreover, in such an equilibrium the contingent savings si and prices pi, for all
i = 1, . . . , k, satisfy
si =
pj
pi
sj (4)
for all i, j = 1, . . . , k, so that not only all the agents choose their savings rationally
according to their expectations, but markets clear as well (in effect, in any state i
the desired saving si by the young agent equals then the desired consumption p
j
pi s
j
by the contemporary old agent born in any state j). Conditions for the existence
of prices pi, savings si, and probabilities piij , for i, j = 1, . . . , k, such that (3) and
(4) hold for all i, j = 1, . . . , k are well known,11 and such an equilibrium is known
in the literature as a k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium.
11See the sunspot equilibrium literature, e.g. Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986),
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1988, 1989), Guesnerie (1989).
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Note however that, as soon as k ≥ 3 in equation (3) the same savings decision
si can follow from different beliefs about the probabilities pii1, . . . , piik of transition
from a price pi to any other pj . In effect, at any such equilibrium each vector
(pii1, . . . , piik) of probabilities of transition from each state i = 1, . . . , k, must satisfy
the two linear equations consisting of (i) being in the unit simplex in Rk and
(ii) satisfying equation (3), so that there remains k − 2 degrees of freedom for
each row (pii1, . . . , piik) of the Markov matrix (piij)ki,j=1 of believed probabilities of
transition between prices, as illustrated in Figure 1 below for the case k = 3, where
pii· ≡ (pii1, . . . , piik) and Dij ≡ −u1(y − si, p
i
pj s
i) + u2(y − si, p
i
pj s
i) p
i
pj .
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Thus equations (3) and (4) may hold true —i.e., (i) everyone behaves rationally
given his believes and (ii) markets clear— even with different agents within and
across generations holding different beliefs about the probabilities of transition piij ,
if no further requirement is made on the agents’ beliefs. Of course, this possibility
is excluded if the agents are supposed to hold rational expectations, since in that
case all the agents must share the same ”true” piij ’s. Note however that until now
I have not made any mention to the existence of a ”true” objective process from
which this ”true” piij ’s would stem, but rather I have only mentioned the agents’
expectations about future prices. That is because in a k-state stationary sunspot
equilibrium (and all the corresponding literature) the probability piij with which
the agent expects the transition from a price pi to a price pj to happen is implic-
itly assumed to be the actual probability with which such transition does happen,
because of a never falsified belief in a perfect correlation between some sunspot
signal and prices.12 Note that this amounts to assuming implicitely a price forma-
tion mechanism that is extraneous to the equilibrium notion, very much like an ad
hoc choice of a particular equilibrium price out of a multiplicity of them in a, for
instance, Edgeworth box. More specifically, the rational expectations hypothesis
imposes the additional condition that (i) all agents’ expectations coincide, and (ii)
that these common expectations correspond to those following from an objective
process driving prices. Note that, in terms of the equilibrium equations (3) and (4),
this second condition has no bite in the sunspot case, since it can just be dropped
12No explanation of how this correlation happens to appear is usually provided, except for
that of Woodford (1990), and in that case a small seed of uncertainty about the fundamentals is
needed for an accidental correlation to get reinforced and convergence to the ”sunspot theory” to
obtain.
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without any consequence for the set of solutions to the equations. It is in this sense
that the assumption of an objective process driving prices is an implicitly ad hoc
selection device in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals. But (i) without (ii)
becomes arbitrary, and raises difficult questions regarding the spontaneous coordi-
nation of every agent within and across the infinity of generations on a particular
belief. Accordingly, both (i) and (ii) can arguably be dropped and the relevance of
the rational expectations hypothesis be questioned in the absence of shocks to the
fundamentals.
As a matter of fact, plenty of beliefs are compatible with the agents’ behavior,
and thus there is room for alternative consistency conditions at equilibrium, other
than the rational expectations hypothesis, to be imposed on the agents’ expecta-
tions, although hopefully only outcomes following from rationally formed beliefs
can be equilibrium ones. Moving in this direction, clearly the agents’ expectations
should follow from the information available to them at the time of making their
decisions. Accordingly, assuming that any given agent’s decision follows from ex-
pectations derived from beliefs that do not make the likelihood of the history of
prices he observes as big as possible, among all the expectations that would have led
to the same decision, is equivalent to assume that the agent formed his expectations
irrationally or using inefficiently the available information. In Figure 2 below, for
the case k = 3, the agent’s rationally formed expectations about these probabilities
of transition from a price pi (if he believes the prices follow a Markov process)
would be the point p¯ii·tδ (where t stands for the date up to which the generation t
can observe a history of prices δ) attaining the highest likelihood level curve on the
unit simplex among those consistent with the first-order condition satisfied by the
agent’s saving decision (represented by the plane intersecting the unit simplex in
Figure 2). Note that the empirical frequencies of transitions starting from pi (the
number of observed transitions from price pi to each price pj over the number of
times pi has realized, depicted as pii·tδ in Figure 2) would be the beliefs that best
explain the observed history if no consistency with the agent’s choice is required,
but such expectations need not be consistent with the agent’s behavior, or will be
so just by chance.
Figure 2
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Thus positive prices p¯i, savings s¯i, for all i = 1, . . . , k, and history-dependent
beliefs about a markovian price process (p¯iijtδ)
k
i,j=1, for every history δ of prices and
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up to every date t, such that
3∑
j=1
p¯iijtδ
[
− u1(y − s¯i, p¯
i
p¯j
s¯i) + u2(y − s¯i, p¯
i
p¯j
s¯i)
p¯i
p¯j
]
= 0 (5)
and
s¯j =
p¯i
p¯j
s¯i, ∀j = 1, . . . , k (6)
hold for all i = 1, . . . , k, and for every history δ up to every period t, constitute
a rationally formed expectations equilibrium if, and only if, any other vector of
probabilities pii· satisfying (5) implies a lower likelihood for the realization of history
δ up to period t than p¯ii·tδ does, for all i = 1, . . . , k and for every history δ and up
to every period t.
Intuitively, as this example illustrates, at a rationally formed expectations equi-
librium the expected probabilities p¯ii·tδ will typically be different for different gener-
ations, since they will have access to histories of different length or span, and hence
the observed empirical frequencies of transition pii·tδ will be different for different
t’s even for a given history δ. Also, within generations the need for each agent’s
expected probabilities to be consistent with their respective different choices leaves
room the agents’ beliefs to differ among them as well.
2.2 Rationally formed expectations equilibria distinct
from rational expectations equilibria
From equations (5) and (6) —that differ from those of a sunspot equilibrium
only in that they make expectations history dependent— one could be tempted to
suspect that any rationally formed expectations equilibrium should converge to a
sunspot equilibrium, given that in the case in which an objective sunspot process is
supposed to drive prices the empirical frequencies of transition between prices would
eventually converge to the actual probabilities of transition. As a consequence,
there would not be any allocational difference between the sunspot equilibrium
and the rationally formed expectations equilibrium in that case. Nevertheless, this
is not exactly so: there do exist rationally formed expectations equilibria whose
allocations are not rational expectations equilibrium allocations.
In order to show that rationally formed expectations equilibria do not replicate
rational expectation equilibria (in particular from the allocations viewpoint), I will
illustrate in this framework the existence of rationally formed expectations equilib-
ria fluctuating between some given states even when there is no stationary sunspot
equilibrium fluctuating between those states.
The argument is constructive, starting from a k-state Markovian stationary
sunspot equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy with a representative
agent with utility function u and endowments e = (e1, e2). That is to say, consider,
for all i = 1, . . . , k, a price pi, first and second period consumptions ci1 and c
i
2 and a
Markov matrix of probabilities of transition (piij)ki,j=1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , k,
ci1 + c
i
2 = e1 + e2 (7)
11
and
(ci1, (c
j
2)
k
j=1) ∈ argmax
k∑
j=1
piiju(c˜i1, c˜
j
2)
pi(c˜i1−e1)+pj(c˜j2−e2)=0, ∀j
(8)
Then necessarily the contingent consumptions ci1, c
i
2 satisfy the equations, for all
i = 1, . . . , k
k∑
j=1
piijDij = 0 (9)
where Dij ≡ u1(ci1, cj2)(ci1−e1)+u2(ci1, cj2)(ci2−e2). Figure 1 above shows for k = 3
the linear constraint on the simplex that the equilibrium equations impose on the
probabilities of transition from any price pi.
Now imagine this was in fact an economy of two identical (types of) agents A
and B per generation, so that u and e are the utility and preferences uh and eh
of both agents h = A,B and, for all i, j = 1, . . . , k, ci1 and c
j
2 are the equilibrium
contingent consumptions chi1 and c
hj
2 of both h = A,B as well. Consider then a
nearby economy in which agent B has a different utility function uB close to u
(while uA continues to be u). Since uB is now different from, but close enough to u
(in values and, at least, first partial derivatives), then the linear constraints on each
row of the Markov matrix generated by the first order conditions of agent B still
intersect the simplex but differ from those of agents A. Actually, for some robust
perturbations the new linear constraints on the probabilities of transition have no
intersection with the old ones on the unit simplex, as illustrated in Figure 2 in the
case k = 3.
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This implies that for the resulting economies there is no Markov matrix that makes
both agents 1 and 2 choose the contingent consumptions ci1 and c
j
2 whenever facing
the prices pi, pj , for all i, j = 1, . . . , k. In effect, as long as the perturbation makes
the normal vector Di·B to the linear subspace (10) following from for agent B’s first-
order conditions to be distinct from the corresponding vector Di·A for agent A, but
being spanned by Di·A and the normal vector to the unit simplex (1, . . . , 1), then
12
the system
k∑
j=1
piijDijA = 0
k∑
j=1
piijDijB = 0
(10)
has no solution within the unit simplex. Note that there is a (k − 2)-dimensional
manifold (after normalization) of possible vectors Di·B satisfying this condition. Of
course, any other perturbation close enough to one on this manifold would still
be such that no k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium exists with this
support for the corresponding 2-agent overlapping generations economy.
Notwithstanding, there do exist rationally formed expectations equilibria over
the given support for any of the 2-agent economies resulting from such robust
perturbations. In effect, for small enough perturbations the unit simplex still has
a nonempty intersection with the linear subspaces following from the agents’ first-
order conditions and hence, for all h, δ, and t, there exist probabilities (pihijtδ )
k
i,j=1,
that maximize the likelihood
∏k
i,j=1(pi
ij)
∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ of observing the history δ up to
period t, among the probabilities of transition in the unit simplex that are consistent
with the agent’s first-order conditions
k∑
j=1
piijDijh = 0 (11)
for all i = 1, . . . , k (the existence, illustrated in Figure 3 below for k = 3, is
guaranteed by the continuity of the likelihood function and the compactness of the
constrained domain).
Figure 3
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3. The general case
I will formalize entire histories of prices {pt}t∈T (where T can be either N or Z)13
taking at any period any of a finite number14 k of possible values p1, . . . , pk, by
13In the case T = N, a special first generation of agents born old is assumed as usual.
14Prices can be thought of as being expressed in multiples of euro cents, and to be believed
by the agents to be above some sufficiently high value with probability 0, so that prices can take
indeed only a finite number (although maybe very big) of values, for all practical purposes.
13
means of a function δit indicating whether the price pi has been realized at period t
or not. Thus δit = 1 whenever pt = pi, and equals 0 otherwise. Since only one price
can prevail at any period t, it must hold that
∑k
i=1 δ
i
t = 1 for all t ∈ T . Therefore,
a history of realizations is a sequence δ = {δt}t∈T of k-tuples of k−1 zeros and one
1 at the position of the realized price at that period, that is to say, for all t ∈ T ,
δt ∈ {0, 1}k and
∑k
i=1 δ
i
t = 1. Let ∆ denote the set of such sequences.
Next I provide a formal definition of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium.
Consider a deterministic stationary overlapping generations exchange economy with
a representative generation consisting of a number H of 2-period lived agents with
utility function uh and endowments eh = (eh1 , e
h
2 ), for all h = 1, . . . , H. I will
assume, without loss of generality, that the agents believe that prices follow a k-
state Markov chain over k prices (Lemma 1 below establishes that this assumption
is not restrictive). Agents have access to historical records of length m (maybe
infinity), so that they know the price of the good in the last m periods.
Definition. A rationally formed expectations equilibrium of the deterministic sta-
tionary overlapping generations exchange economy with representative generation
(uh, eh)Hh=1 with memory m consists of
(1) a finite number k of positive prices for consumption, i.e. for each i =
1, . . . , k, some pi > 0,
(2) nonnegative first-period consumptions and contingent plans of second-period
consumptions for each agent at each possible price when young, i.e. for each
h = 1, . . . ,H and each i = 1, . . . , k, some non-negative (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1), and
(3) beliefs about the probabilities of transition between prices for each agent
and any history of prices up to his date of birth, i.e. for all h = 1, . . . , H,
all t ∈ T , and all realization δ ∈ ∆, a Markov matrix (pihijtδ )ki,j=1,15
such that
(1) the allocation is feasible, i.e. for all i = 1, . . . , k
H∑
h=1
(chi1 + c
hi
2 ) =
H∑
h=1
(eh1 + e
h
2 ) (12)
(2) for every agent h and any history δ up to the date t in which he is born,
his first-period consumption and contingent plan of second-period consump-
tions (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) are optimal, given his beliefs, whenever at t the price
is pi, i.e. for all h = 1, . . . , H, all δ ∈ ∆, all t ∈ T , and all i = 1, . . . , k, it
holds(
chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1
)
= argmax
k∑
j=1
pihijtδ u
h(ci1, c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1 − eh1 ) + pj(cj2 − eh2 ) = 0, ∀j
(13)
15Note that although with the chosen notation every agent is supposed to hold beliefs about
the probabilities of transition between prices after every partial history of realizations (i.e. even
those beyond his life-span), in fact only the possible histories of realizations up to the date of his
decision are relevant for the equilibrium conditions above. If the length m of the memory is finite,
then the number of possible bits of history relevant for the agent’s decision is clearly finite, so
that every member of every generation is required to hold actually only finitely many beliefs. In
the infinite memory case this is still the case if there is a first period, but not any longer if there
is no first period, then the number of beliefs would be countable.
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(3) for every agent, no other compatible beliefs on the probabilities of transition
(i.e. among those for which his first-period consumption and contingent
plan of second-period consumptions (chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1) are optimal whenever
at t the price is pi) provide a higher likelihood to the history of prices
he remembers, i.e. for all h = 1, . . . , H, all t ∈ N, all δ ∈ ∆,16 and all
i = 1, . . . , k, if pii· ∈ Sk−1 is such that
(
chi1 , {chj2 }kj=1
)
= argmax
k∑
j=1
piijuh(ci1, c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1 − eh1 ) + pj(cj2 − eh2 ) = 0, ∀j
(14)
then
k∏
j=1
(piij)
∑t
τ=t−m δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ ≤
k∏
j=1
(pihijtδ )
∑t
τ=t−m δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ (15)
and
(4) the agents beliefs about the probabilities of transition are not falsified by
history, i.e. if m = ∞, then for all h = 1, . . . , H, all t ∈ N, all δ ∈ ∆, and
all i, j = 1, . . . , k,
pihijδt − limt′→−∞
∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τ
= 0 (16)
if T = Z, or
lim
t→∞
[
pihijδt −
∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
]
= 0 (17)
if T = N, whenever the limit in the left-hand side exists.
Note first that if, in the definition above, the beliefs are constrained to be history
and agent independent (so that pihijδt becomes pi
ij) and the last conditions (3) and
(4) are dropped, then it becomes the definition of a stationary rational expectations
(sunspot) equilibrium following a k-state Markov chain (note that condition (4) is
trivially satisfied by a k-SSE). As a consequence, it is worth noticing that, typically,
in such a rational expectations equilibrium there exist, for every agent, beliefs about
the probabilities of transition that are consistent with his consumption choice but
that make the history he observes likelier than the equilibrium beliefs do. Of course
the discrepancy of the agents’ believed probabilities of transition with the likelihood
maximizing ones after each possible history vanishes in the limit if, as the sunspot
equilibrium interpretation would have it, the prices are supposed (as opposed to be
believed) to follow actually a given Markov chain. But, as I have argued before,
the very existence of a specific stochastic process that drives prices is difficult to
justify in the absence of shocks to the fundamentals. Moreover, in the case one
wants the equilibrium concept to at least aspire to have some positive content, the
16See note 14 above.
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counterfactual assumption that beliefs are history independent points to another
weakness of the rational expectations equilibrium concept in this context.
Secondly, note also that the length m of the memory determines, in the last
condition of the definition above, the transitions that are remembered by the agent
when assessing the likelihood of the recent past according to his beliefs, compared
to alternative beliefs. In the case m is infinity, the entire history of prices is re-
membered by all generations for these purposes.
Finally note that, as previously claimed, restricting ourselves in the definition
above to equilibria in which agents believe that the history of prices has been
generated by a Markov process is not really constraining since such a belief cannot
be falsified by any history they may observe, as the following lemma establishes.
Lemma 1. Any history of prices exhibits, either exactly or asymptotically, the
Markovian property. That is to say, more precisely, for any given history δ =
{δt}t∈T ∈ ∆ of prices,
(1) if T = Z, then the sequence of empirical frequencies of transition from any
price pi to a price pj is constant, and
(2) if T = N, then the sequence of empirical frequencies of transition from any
price pi to a price pj converges.
Proof. Assume first that T = N. The difference between two consecutive terms of
the empirical frequency of transitions from any given price pi to a price pj is∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
−
∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
=
1∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
[
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτ
t∑
τ=1
δiτδ
j
τ+1 −
t∑
τ=1
δiτ
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτδ
j
τ+1
]
=
1∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
[
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτ
(
δitδ
j
t+1 +
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτδ
j
τ+1
)
−
(
δit +
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτ
)
t−1∑
τ=1
δiτδ
j
τ+1
]
=
δit∑t
τ=1 δ
i
τ
[
δjt+1 −
∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=1 δ
i
τ
]
(18)
Now only two cases must be considered. Either price pi is visited finitely many
times, or countably many times. If it is visited finitely many times then for some t
onwards δit = 0, so that the distance between the empirical frequencies of transition
becomes 0 from that term on. Hence the sequence of empirical frequencies of
transition from pi to pj becomes constant and therefore convergent. If pi is visited
countably many times, then the first factor of the last expression converges to zero
(the numerator is bounded and the denominator is non-decreasing and not non-
increasing), while the second factor between brackets is in the bounded interval
[−1, 1] (the first term is in {0, 1} and the second is in [0, 1]), then this sequence
of differences converges to zero, and hence so does the distance between empirical
frequencies of transition from pi to pj . Since the interval [0, 1], being compact,
is complete, then the empirical frequencies of transition from pi to pj themselves
converge as well.
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If T = Z, the empirical frequency at any given date t of the transitions from any
price pi to any price pj is the limit
lim
t′→−∞
∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τδ
j
τ+1∑t−1
τ=t′ δ
i
τ
(19)
which exists for the same reasons as above (the sequence of empirical frequencies of
transitions from pi to pj over a period extending increasingly backwards is Cauchy
in a complete space, the compact [0, 1]) and is independent of t. The constancy of
the sequence of empirical frequencies from pi to pj follows then trivially. Q.E.D.
The previous lemma has the following important implications. In the case his-
tory extends infinitely into the past and the agents keep records of the entire past
history, their belief in the price process being a realization of a Markov chain is
never falsified, no matter what sequence of prices is realized. In the alternative
case in which history starts at a definite date —so that recorded history consists
always of a finite set of observations for each generation— and the agents keep
records of the entire finite history at their disposal, they see any dependence of the
probabilities of transition on earlier prices having the tendency to vanish, i.e. the
Markovian property of the history of prices —and hence the agents’ belief— tends
to be confirmed, rather than falsified, as time goes by. The same will be true in
both cases if the agents’ memory is finite but long enough to observe the tendency
towards convergence of the empirical frequencies of transition. So, whatever is the
process that determines the sequence of prices, the possibility that the realized se-
quence falsifies the agents’ beliefs that this process is Markovian vanishes for long
enough memories.
At any rate, and even more importantly, even in the case the agents do not
have access to historical records long enough to see disappearing any dependence of
probabilities of transition on past prices, the agents know nonetheless that should
they have had access to the entire history, that would have only confirmed their
belief that they are facing a Markovian price process. As a consequence, such a
belief is utmost rational even when limited records are not long enough to confirm
it.
Of course if the memory is finite or T = N the agents will share the belief
in Markovian prices while not agreeing on the specific probabilities of transition
governing that process, since they have access to different bits of history. On the
contrary, if memory is infinite and T = Z, they all have to agree on the probabilities
of transitions as well; while, finally, if memory is infinite and T = N, they all
”eventually agree”, meaning that discrepancies of subsequent generations vanish.
In the last two cases, in which all agents agree (maybe asymptotically) on the
probabilities of transition as well, the limit of the sequence of empirical frequencies
would necessarily have to be in the intersection on the unit simplex of the linear
subspaces determined by the agents’ FOCs, as shown in Proposition 2 below. In
other words, in case of infinite memory the only rationally formed expectations
equilibria are those for which such an intersection exists. But these equilibria are
observationally equivalent to the rational expectations sunspot equilibrium associ-
ated with such an intersection.
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Proposition 2. If m is infinite, any rationally formed expectations equilibrium of
the stationary deterministic overlapping generations exchange economy (uh, eh)Hh=1
is observationally equivalent to a k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilib-
rium.
Proof. From Lemma 1 the empirical frequencies of transition between any two prices
converge, for any realization of prices, independently of whether the sequence is a
realization of a Markov chain or not.
Assume that at a rationally formed expectations equilibrium the linear subspaces
induced by the agents FOCs do not intersect on the unit simplex for transitions
from pi. Then the distance from some agent’s beliefs about the probabilities of
transition to the limits of the empirical frequencies remains bounded away from
zero, which cannot be at equilibrium because of condition (4) in the definition.
Therefore, in this case at a rationally formed expectations equilibrium the linear
subspaces induced by the agents FOCs do intersect on the unit simplex for every
price pi at the limit of the empirical transitions, and then the rationally formed
expectations equilibrium is observationally equivalent to the k-state Markovian
stationary sunspot equilibrium with a Markov matrix whose entries are precisely
these limits of the empirical frequencies of transition. Q.E.D.
Therefore, rationally formed expectations equilibria that are distinct from ratio-
nal expectations equilibria in this setup, can only appear in the case in which the
memory is finite. There can be many reasons why m is finite in the relevant cases.
People tend to make forecasts based on their recent experiences, with memories of
variable lengths, but certainly of finite length if only because of their actual and
unavoidable limited recording and computing capacity. Thus the limited memory
case seems to be the relevant one for addressing observed excess volatilities, while
the observational equivalence of rationally formed expectations equilibria and ra-
tional expectations sunspot equilibria in the infinite memory case makes rather an
interesting point as limiting theoretical result.
The next proposition establishes that any deterministic stationary overlapping
generations economy with sunspot equilibria can be perturbed robustly in order to
produce rationally formed expectations equilibria that no sunspot equilibrium can
match. Therefore the use of the rational expectations hypothesis discards all the
excess volatility exhibited by these equilibria and, in this sense, downplays the role
that expectations have in the fluctuations of the economy.
Proposition 3. Arbitrarily close17 to every deterministic stationary overlapping
generations economy with a finite-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium
there exists an economy with finite-memory rationally formed expectations equilib-
ria distinct from any sunspot equilibrium.
Proof. Let (uh, eh)Hh=1 be the representative generation of a stationary overlapping
generations economy, and let
{
pi, chi1 , c
hi
2
}i=k,h=H
i=1,h=1
be the contingent prices and
consumptions of a k-state Markovian stationary sunspot equilibrium of the economy
driven by a Markov chain with matrix of probabilities of transition (piij)ki,j=1.
17In the topology of C1-convergence over compacta in the space of utility functions.
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Assume, without loss of generality, that the allocation corresponding in this
equilibrium to the agents of type H only is feasible with their only resources, i.e.18
cHi1 + c
Hi
2 = e
H
1 + e
H
2 . (20)
Consider a new economy with a representative generation (uh, eh)H+1h=1 consisting
of adding an agent H + 1 with the same endowments and consumptions as agent
H (the new allocation of the new economy is feasible because of the assumption
above), and a utility function uH+1 with gradients at the consumption bundles
(cHi1 , c
Hj
2 )
k
i,j=1 such that, for some i = 1, . . . , k, the vector (D
i1
uH+1 , . . . , D
ik
uH+1),
where Dij
uh
≡ uh1 (chi1 , chj2 )(chi1 − eh1 ) + uh2 (chi1 , chj2 )(chj2 − eh2 ) for h = H + 1, is both
not collinear to (Di1uH , . . . , D
ik
uH ) and in the span of this vector and (1, . . . , 1), i.e.D
i1
uH+1
...
DikuH+1
 = α
D
i1
uH
...
DikuH
+ β
 1...
1
 (21)
for some α and β, with β 6= 0.19 Then the system of equations in the probabilities
piij
pii1Di1uH + · · ·+ piikDikuH = 0
pii1Di1uH+1 + · · ·+ piikDikuH+1 = 0.
(22)
has no solution. In effect, using the equation (21) above, the second equation can
be written equivalently as
α
(
pii1Di1uH + · · ·+ piikDikuH
)
+ β(pii1 + · · ·+ piik) = 0 (23)
but since
∑k
j=1 pi
ijDij
uH
= 0 and β 6= 0, then one would have to have that
pii1 + · · ·+ piik = 0!! (24)
This establishes that the prices and consumptions
{
pi, chi1 , c
hi
2
}i=k,h=H+1
i=1,h=1
, with
(cH+1i1 , c
H+1j
2 )
k
i,j=1 = (c
Hi
1 , c
Hj
2 )
k
i,j=1, are not those of a sunspot equilibrium of
the economy with representative generation (uh, eh)H+1h=1 (in effect, otherwise the
system above would have a solution). They nevertheless are the allocation and
prices of a rationally formed expectations equilibrium of this economy.
In effect, if uH+1 is close enough to uH in the topology of C1-convergence over
compacta, then for all h = 1, . . . , H + 1, all t ∈ N, and all δ ∈ ∆, there exists(
pihijtδ
)k
i,j=1
satisfying
(
pihijtδ
)k
i,j=1
= argmax
piij
k∏
i,j=1
(piij)
∑t
τ=t−m δ
i
τ−1δ
j
τ
s.t. ∀i, pii·∈Sk−1
∀i,
(
chi1 ,{chj2 }kj=1
)
=argmax
∑k
j=1 pi
ijuh(ci1,c
j
2)
s.t. pi(ci1−eh1 )+pj(cj2−eh2 )=0, ∀j
(25)
18There is always a subset of types of agents for which this is true (note that this subset needs
not be proper). In general, the replication and perturbation argument would then be done on all
the types of agents of the subset.
19Note that since
∑k
j=1 pi
ijDij
uH
= 0, the vector (Di1
uH
, . . . , Dik
uH
) cannot be collinear to
(1, . . . , 1). Moreover there is a 1-dimensional manifold of directions that the vector (Di1
uH+1
, . . . ,
Dik
uH+1
) can take while satisfying this conditions.
19
since the likelihood function that is being maximized is continuous in every case,
and the constrained set consisting of the probabilities vectors (pii1, . . . , piik) in the
unit simplex satisfying the linear first-order conditions of each agent maximizing
his utility at (c¯hi1 , {c¯hj2 }kj=1) whenever the first-period price is pi, is non-empty
and compact. The same is true for any robust and small enough perturbation
u˜H+1 of uH+1, therefore not necessarily putting (Di1u˜H+1 , . . . , D
ik
u˜H+1) in the span of
(Di1uH , . . . , D
ik
uH ) and (1, . . . , 1).
Note finally that since m is finite, the remembered empirical frequencies of tran-
sition do not converge, so that the agents beliefs do not stay bounded away from a
limit of such frequencies, which would falsify the agents’ beliefs.
Q.E.D.
Given that Proposition 3 establishes that the notion of rationally formed expec-
tations equilibrium is able to account for more fluctuations in the allocation and
prices as equilibrium phenomena than the rational expectations equilibrium con-
cept, one would like to have an idea of where do the limits of this expansion lay.
Or at least whether the proposed equilibrium notion does not go too far as to be
able to rationalize any fluctuations as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In order to see that not anything can be made into a rationally formed expec-
tations equilibrium, consider a feasible allocation of consumptions ci1, c
i
2, for all
i = 1, . . . , k, such that for some agent h, and some price pi, it holds that all his
trades contingent to any price pj he may face in his second period of life imply
a higher marginal rate of substitution of future for present consumption than the
corresponding implicit relative price, i.e.
Dij ≡ u1(ci1, cj2)(ci1 − e1) + u2(ci1, cj2)(ci2 − e2) < 0
for all j = 1, . . . , k. For this to happen, in the case the marginal rate of substitution
is smaller than 1 at the endowments point, it suffices that ci1 is small enough
whenever the solutions are guaranteed to be always interior, as illustrated in Figure
4 below.
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Then the set of expectations consistent with agent h’s choice of ci1 when facing
pi in his first period of life is empty (in Figure 5 below there would-be FOC plane
does not intersect the unit simplex, since its normal direction is in the strictly
positive orthant). As a consequence, no fluctuations between the feasible allocation
of consumption levels ci1, c
i
2, for all i = 1, . . . , k, can result from a rationally formed
expectations equilibrium.
Figure 5
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